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I. eƽƣƞƿiƣƾ
Switzerland traditionally adopts a friendly and respectful attitude towards 
international law. As a relatively small export- driven country, Switzerland 
depends on stable international relations, based on the rule of law. It is no sur-
prise, then, that Switzerland participates in numerous international organisa-
tions and treaty networks. Nowadays, Switzerland’s membership of the United 
Nations (UN) provides the foundation. Also significant is Switzerland’s mem-
bership of other organisations and treaty networks, covering almost any policy 
field conceivable, like trade, investment, monetary issues, taxation, transpor-
tation, telecommunication, environment, development, food, health, educa-
tion, culture, metrology, and weapons control. Switzerland is also a signatory 
to various human rights treaties; amongst them the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), which has been attributed a quasi- constitutional sta-
tus by the Federal Supreme Court.1 It is not a member of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO); at least, it participates in Partnership for Peace 
(PfP). The first section of this chapter examines Switzerland’s participation in 
various organisations and treaty networks.
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢè ᅬ Ƣƣƾƻiƿƣ iƿƾ lƺơƞƿiƺƹ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ʃƣƞƽƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ ơƺƹƿi-
nent, surrounded by three of the six founding members of the then- named 
Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ EơƺƹƺƸiơ CƺƸƸǀƹiƿǄ ᄬEECᄭèᅬ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƞ ƸƣƸƟƣƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ 
Union (EU). Still, it is of prime importance to Switzerland that it maintains 
close and stable relations with the EU and its member states. Swiss member-
ship of the Council of Europe and the bilateral agreements with the EU are 
also discussed below.
ᇳ. fء؜اؘؗ Nؔا؜آءئ ؔءؗ dأؘؖ؜ؔ؟؜ئؘؗ Aؘؚءؖ؜ؘئ
Founded in 1945 in the aftermath of two devastating world wars, the UN’s 
primary aim is to maintain and achieve collective security. As a truly glo-
bal organisation, it provides a unique forum for all nations and other actors 
1 See the chapter on Constitutional Law, p. 144.
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to co- operate on the international plane. Its outreach, both in terms of its 
membership and the variety of subject matters it has competence to deal 
with, is unrivalled by any other international organisation. Currently, its 
membership encompasses 193 member states. Various programmes, funds 
and specialised agencies also operate under the UN, all of which have their 
own memberships and budget. Among the programmes and funds are the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP). The specialised agencies are fully- f ledged international organisa-
tions; they include, among others, the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the two Bretton Woods ins-
titutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
main seat of the UN in Europe is in Geneva; the headquarters are at the Palais 
des Nations, which was originally built to house the League of Nations, the 
ƻƽƣƢƣơƣƾƾƺƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ fN ᄬᇳᇻᇴᇲᅬᇳᇻᇶᇸᄭ.
Regarding Switzerland’s involvement with the UN, it did not actually join 
the organisation until 2002. The accession process was instigated by a popu-
lƞƽ iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ; ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞƻƻƽƺǁƣƢ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞơơƣƾƾiƺƹèᅬ ƞlƟƣiƿ 
Ƽǀiƿƣ ƹƞƽƽƺǂlǄ, ƟǄ ƺƹlǄ ᇷᇶ.ᇸè%. BƣƤƺƽƣ jƺiƹiƹƨ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƩƞƢ ƞlƽƣƞƢǄ ƻƞƽ-
ticipated in many of the UN’s specialised agencies, programmes and funds. 
It had been a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund since 1992. Since acceding to the UN, Switzerland has played an 
active role in the organisation. It was involved in the foundation of the new 
HǀƸƞƹ ciƨƩƿƾ Cƺǀƹơil iƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇸ ƞƹƢ Ʃƞƾ ƞơƿiǁƣlǄ ơƺƹƿƽiƟǀƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƟƞƿƣ 
on the potential reform of the Security Council.2 Switzerland has also for-
mally applied to become a member of the Security Council for the period of 
ᇴᇲᇴᇵᅬᇴᇶ; ƣlƣơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƽƣ ƾơƩƣƢǀlƣƢ Ƥƺƽ ᇴᇲᇴᇴ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil, 
membership of the Security Council would not compromise Switzerland’s 
policy of neutrality.3
2 FƣƢƣƽƞl DƣƻƞƽƿƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ Fƺƽƣiƨƹ éƤƤƞiƽƾ ᄬFDFé; Ʃƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/éᇸdj- eijKᄭ.
3 For more detail on Switzerland’s policy of neutrality, see p. 174.
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ᇴ. eإؘؔؗ ؔءؗ Iءةؘئاؠؘءا
The World Trade Organization (WTO) sets out the basic legal framework 
for international trade. It was founded in 1995 as a successor to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 and largely continued the latter’s 
ƞƻƻƽƺƞơƩ. eƩƣ heO ơǀƽƽƣƹƿlǄ Ʃƞƾ ᇳᇸᇶ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ƞƹƢ iƾ ƾiƿǀƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ 
Centre William Rappard, Geneva. The WTO Agreement, which established 
the organisation, has three main annexes which legally bind all members: 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (embracing various side- 
agreements, on issues such as technical barriers to trade, agriculture, anti- 
dumping, and countervailing measures), the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs). These agreements provide for the basic principles 
of market access, non- discrimination, and transparency to be respected by 
all members while simultaneously allowing them to pursue equally legiti-
mate policy objectives, like the protection of public morals, the environment 
and human and animal health and life. Another key WTO agreement is the 
plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, which sets out rules 
for public tendering. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides 
for a fully- f ledged state- to- state dispute resolution mechanism. Panels and, 
upon appeal, the Appellate Body render binding rulings. If a defending party 
does not comply with such a ruling, the complaining party is permitted to 
suspend obligations vis- à- vis the defending party, i.e. to impose retaliatory 
measures. 
Switzerland has a long history of involvement with the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1947. It had become a member of the General Agreement 
ƺƹ eƞƽiƤƤƾ ƞƹƢ eƽƞƢƣ iƹ ᇳᇻᇸᇸ ᄬƩƞǁiƹƨ ƞƻƻliƣƢ iƿƾ ƽǀlƣƾ Ƣƣ Ƥƞơƿƺ ƾiƹơƣ ᇳᇻᇸᇲᄭ. 
Subsequently, when the WTO became the successor of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade in 1995, Switzerland was an original member. Since then, 
the WTO has provided the backbone of Swiss external economic relations. 
Swiss companies profit from binding market access rights abroad. To date, 
Switzerland has only once actively participated in WTO dispute settlement 
ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƞƾ ƞ ơƺƸƻlƞiƹiƹƨ ƺƽ ƢƣƤƣƹƢiƹƨ ƻƞƽƿǄèᅬ iƿ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿƣƢ ƞƾ ƞ ơƺƸƻ-
lƞiƹiƹƨ ƻƞƽƿǄ iƹ ƿƩƣ fdèᅬ dƿƣƣl ơƞƾƣ.4
4 See pp. 183.
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Further, aside from WTO agreements, Switzerland has concluded a 
series of free trade agreements with countries all over the globe.5 In addi-
tion to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the free trade 
agreement with the EU,ᇸ Switzerland currently has a network of 28 free 
trade agreements with 38 partners. Switzerland has usually concluded its 
free trade agreements together with its EFTA partners Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein; examples are the agreements with Macedonia, Serbia, 
Ukraine, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Mexico, Singapore, Chile, the Republic of 
Kƺƽƣƞ, ƿƩƣ déCf dƿƞƿƣƾ ᄬiƹơlǀƢiƹƨ dƺǀƿƩ éƤƽiơƞᄭ, CƞƹƞƢƞ, ƞƹƢ Hƺƹƨ Kƺƹƨ. 
Recently, Switzerland has also entered into agreements on its own; this has 
been the case with respect to the agreements with Japan and China. The 
main objective of free trade agreements is not only to improve market access 
for Swiss companies per se, but also to ensure that Swiss companies enjoy 
market access conditions which are at least as favourable as those enjoyed 
by its main competitors (in particular those competitors located in the EU). 
In this context, the conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA) has led Switzerland to try 
to renegotiate specific elements of the free trade agreement with Canada. 
Further, the possible (although currently highly unlikely) conclusion of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the US 
(TTIP) would result in even clearer disadvantages for Swiss companies vis- 
à- vis their competitors in the EU; Switzerland would be forced to make new 
attempts to level the playing field.
Switzerland is also a party to other international organisations and tre-
aty networks which complement the multilateral trading system under 
the WTO and free trade agreements. Examples include the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) and the Organization of Economic Co- operation and 
Development (OECD). Furthermore, Switzerland has concluded 130 bilate-
ral investment treaties (BITs), mainly with developing and least- developed 
countries. These treaties allow Swiss firms to request the establishment of 
arbitration tribunals, in particular based on the rules of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in order to review 
expropriations.
5 dƿƞƿƣ dƣơƽƣƿƞƽiƞƿ Ƥƺƽ EơƺƹƺƸiơ éƤƤƞiƽƾ ᄬdECO; Ʃƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/JBjᇸ- CcCᇵᄭ.
ᇸ dƣƣ ƻƻ. ᇳᇸᇻ.
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ᇵ. dت؜احؘإ؟ؔءؗ ؔءؗ Eبإآأؘ
ƞᄭ Gƣƹƣƽƞl FƽƞƸƣǂƺƽk
Switzerland was hesitant about joining European organisations and tre-
aty networks after the end of the Second World War, being concerned that 
such action may compromise its position of neutrality, independency and 
autonomy in external trade matters. However, it did join the Organisation 
for European Economic Co- operation (OEEC), whose key purpose was to 
administer the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), as an original 
ƸƣƸƟƣƽ ƞƿ iƿƾ ơƽƣƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ᇳᇻᇶᇺ. Iƹ ᇳᇻᇸᇳ, ƿƩƣ OEEC ǂƞƾ ƽƣƹƞƸƣƢ ƿƩƣ OECD, ƞƹƢ 
both its mandate and membership were substantially broadened. Regarding 
European integration, Switzerland did not participate in the efforts to further 
ƿƩiƾ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ jƺiƹiƹƨ ƿƩƣ EEC/EC/Ef. IƹƾƿƣƞƢ, iƹ ᇳᇻᇸᇲ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƤƺǀƹƢƣƢ 
the EFTA, together with six other European countries. It is still a member of 
EFeé ƿƺ ƿƩiƾ ƢƞǄ, ƿƺƨƣƿƩƣƽ ǂiƿƩ IơƣlƞƹƢ, LiƣơƩƿƣƹƾƿƣiƹ ƞƹƢ NƺƽǂƞǄ. Iƹ ᇳᇻᇸᇵ, 
Switzerland became a member of the Council of Europe, whose prime objec-
tive is to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Further, in 
1974, it also ratified the ECHR. In 1972, Switzerland and the EEC concluded a 
comprehensive free trade agreement which has been providing the basis for 
bilateral relations with the EU up to this day. In 1975, Switzerland became an 
original member of the Conference on Security and Co- operation in Europe 
ᄬCdCEᄭèᅬ ƽƣƹƞƸƣƢ ƿƩƣ Oƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ dƣơǀƽiƿǄ ƞƹƢ Cƺ- ƺƻƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƹ Eǀƽƺƻƣ 
(OSCE) in 1994. In 1992, the people and the cantons rejected accession to the 
European Economic Area (EEA). Thereafter, Switzerland focused, faute de 
mieux, on concluding sectoral treaties with the EC/EU, combined with the 
policy of autonomous adaptation of Swiss law to ensure compliance with EU 
law. This approach, the “Swiss model” of European integration, has proven to 
be successful, as will be further outlined below.
Ɵᄭ Bilƞƿƣƽƞl AƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿƾ
Together with the free trade agreement Switzerland concluded with the 
EEC in 1972, the two sets of bilateral agreements of 1999 and 2004 between 
Switzerland and the EU (the “Bilaterals I” and the “Bilaterals II”) provide 
the legal framework for the Swiss- EU relationship. The Bilaterals I consist 
of seven agreements, mainly dealing with market access (free movement of 
persons, public procurement, technical barriers to trade, trade in agricultural 
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products, land transport, air transport, and research). These agreements are 
tied together by a guillotine clause; the termination of one agreement auto-
matically leads to the termination of the others. The EU insisted on such a 
clause in order to prevent “cherry picking” on the part of Switzerland; the 
former feared that the Swiss people would reject the Agreement on the Free 
MƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ aƣƽƾƺƹƾè ᅬ ƞ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽlǄ ƾƣƹƾiƿiǁƣ iƾƾǀƣ iƹ ƿƩiƾ ơƺǀƹƿƽǄ Ɵǀƿ 
ƞ ơƺƹƢiƿiƺ ƾiƹƣ Ƽǀƞ ƹƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ Efèᅬ iƹ ƞ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ. eƩƣ Bilƞƿƣƽƞlƾ II ơƺƹ-
sist of nine agreements and in some respects go beyond market access: they 
also deal with political issues and co- operation in culture and education 
(Schengen/Dublin, taxation of savings, fight against fraud, trade in processed 
agricultural products, MEDIA, environment, statistics, pensions of former EU 
officials, education and youth programmes). The Bilaterals II do not contain 
a guillotine clause; only the Schengen/Dublin association agreements share 
a common fate. The main agreements are supplemented by over 100 other 
(secondary) agreements. Institutionally, the agreements fail to go beyond the 
classic tools of diplomatic dispute resolution. Dispute resolution under such 
agreements proceeds in agreement- specific mixed committees which decide 
by consensus.
Since 2004, only a few agreements have been concluded, amongst them an 
agreement on customs facilitation and security, which substantially revised 
an older version (1990/2009), and an agreement on the cooperation of com-
petition authorities (2013). Moreover, under further bilateral agreements, 
Switzerland participates in various EU agencies and programmes, including 
Europol, Eurojust, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) 
and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Such participation allows 
Swiss representatives to be integrated into EU transgovernmental structures. 
Swiss representatives are informed on ongoing action and can influence the 
work, mainly by relying on the power of the pen (decision shaping). Naturally, 
they do not possess voting rights (decision- making).
Currently, Switzerland’s “bilateral way” of cooperating with the EU faces 
two major challenges. The first major challenge has arrived in the form of 
a popular initiative approved by the people and the cantons called “against 
mass immigration” (“Gegen Masseneinwanderung”, 2014). According to 
the initiative’s newly introduced Articles 121a and 197 No 11 Constitution,7 
Switzerland shall control the immigration of foreign nationals autonomously, 
7 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101; see for an English 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
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by introducing annual quotas and granting Swiss citizens priority on the job 
market. After the approval of the initiative, the EU made it clear in response 
that it was not willing to renegotiate the Agreement on the Free Movement of 
Persons of 1999 to the effect that quotas and a discriminatory priority system 
for Swiss citizens would be permitted. Against this background, the Federal 
Assembly decided to implement the initiative in a way that ensured it would 
not violate the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons. In the context of 
the Swiss policy of cooperation with the EU, this outcome has been welcomed 
by most commentators. The danger posed to the continuation of the current 
bilateral way has been, at least for the time being, dispelled. However, from 
a constitutional law perspective the outcome is problematic. The wording of 
the initiative’s newly introduced constitutional provisions is clear, and the 
implementing legislation fails to reflect this properly. An initiative commit-
tee successfully collected more than 100’000 signatures for their initiative 
“out of the dead end” (“Raus aus der Sackgasse”, RASA), which provided for 
the deletion of Articles 121a and 197 No 11 Constitution, the articles which had 
been created by the “against mass immigration” initiative. However, the ini-
tiative committee withdrew the initiative in late 2017, meaning the people 
and the cantons do not have the possibility to vote on the matter again. This 
is regrettable.
The second major challenge to the bilateral agreement approach is the 
fact that as of 2008, the EU has made it clear that it expects Switzerland to 
conclude an institutional agreement which provides common rules on the 
dynamic updating of the bilateral agreements, the supervision of their cor-
rect interpretation and application, and dispute resolution. An institutional 
agreement would apply to both new and existing market access agreements 
which are based on EU law. In Switzerland, the prospect of such an instituti-
onal agreement is controversial; some see it as a threat to Switzerland’s sover-
eignty. However, it might actually be advantageous for Switzerland to have 
the increasingly complex treaty network established on a new and clearer 
basis: this would enhance legal security, transparency and efficiency. The EU 
and Switzerland would have a right to bring disputes before a juridical body, 
presumably an arbitration panel (which must involve the European Court of 
Justice where a dispute concerns the interpretation of EU law). Switzerland 
would not depend exclusively on the goodwill of the EU in resolving disputes 
as is the case today. Moreover, the EU has made the conclusion of new mar-
ket access agreements (for example an agreement on electricity and on finan-
cial services) conditional upon the conclusion of an institutional agreement. 
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Thus, if Switzerland wants to benefit from such agreements in the future, it 
must act to establish this institutional agreement. The current state of affairs 
regarding the institutional agreement is that Switzerland and the EU are still 
in the negotiation phase.
ơᄭ AǀƿƺƹƺƸƺǀƾ AƢƞƻƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ Lƞǂ ƿƺ Ef Lƞǂ
In parallel to the tight network of bilateral agreements Switzerland is party 
to, it has adopted another approach to mitigate the negative consequences of 
not being a member of the EU or the EEA: namely, the policy of autonomous 
adaptation of Swiss law to ensure compliance with EU law. According to the 
Federal Council, Switzerland’s “goal has to be to secure the greatest compatibi-
lity of our legislation with the legislation of our European partners in the areas 
of cross- border significance.”8 Of course, it is entirely possible for Switzerland 
to deviate from EU regulations and directives; however, this shall only be the 
chosen approach if there are cogent political and/or economic reasons for 
doing so. 
Overall, the policy of autonomous adaptation has led to the systematic 
adoption of EU law. Typical examples where autonomous adaptation is emplo-
yed are laws concerning technical regulations and standards, data protection 
ƞƹƢ Ƥiƹƞƹơiƞl Ƹƞƽkƣƿƾ. Iƿ Ʃƞƾ Ɵƣƣƹ ƣƾƿiƸƞƿƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ ᇵᇲᅬᇷᇲè% ƺƤ ƞll ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞơƿƾ 
and ordinances are influenced by EU law, directly or indirectly: certainly no 
insignificant proportion.
8 Bericht über die Stellung der Schweiz im europäischen Integrationsprozess vom 
24. August 1988, Federal Gazette No 37 of 20 September 1988, pp. 249, p. 380 (own translation).
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II. Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ
The Federal Constitution contains many provisions relevant to Switzerland’s 
international engagement. These provisions regulate a variety of matters from 
the goals to be pursued in international relations to the different competen-
ces of various actors in this area, in particular those of the federation, the can-
tons and the people. Finally, the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court 
has had a strong influence on the position of international law in Switzerland. 
These areas will be discussed in the upcoming paragraphs.
ᇳ. Gآؔ؟ئ ؔءؗ Mؘؔءئ
The Constitution enlists the goals which Switzerland shall pursue in its inter-
national relations. Partly, these goals are of an egoistic nature while partly, they 
direct the authorities to act altruistically (Preamble, Articles 2 IV, 54 II and 101 
I Constitution). They state that the people and the cantons are resolved to act 
in a spirit of solidarity and openness towards the world; the confederation is 
committed to a just and peaceful international order; it shall ensure that the 
independence of the country and its welfare is safeguarded; it shall contribute 
to the alleviation of need and poverty in the world, to the respect for human 
rights and democracy, to the peaceful co- existence of peoples, and to the con-
servation of natural resources; it shall safeguard the interests of the Swiss eco-
nomy abroad. Regrettably, the Constitution does not reflect the true extent of 
Swiss participation in international and European organisations and treaty 
networks. Only Switzerland’s UN membership is mentioned; it, at least, has 
found its way into the transitional provisions (Article 197 No 1 Constitution).
These constitutional goals are framed in rather abstract terms. Thus, 
in essence, it falls under the discretion of the authorities to concretise 
them when they decide on specific foreign policy measures. Moreover, the 
Constitution does not provide for any applicable rules to follow in the event 
of a conflict between these goals. For instance, there might be controversial 
debate over whether and, if so, to what extent the protection of fundamental 
rights should be taken into account in the context of free trade agreements. 
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The Constitution provides no real guidance in this context. There was some 
debate over this issue when Switzerland negotiated and concluded its free 
trade agreement with China in 2014; there were concerns that such an agree-
ment could foster human rights violations if free trade was relied upon too 
heavily as an end in itself. The eventual result of these negotiations was an 
agreement that reaffirms both parties’ commitment to respecting selected 
fundamental rights and “fundamental norms of international relations” in 
the Preamble, supplemented by a side- agreement on labour and employment.
Some argue that the concept of neutrality also amounts to a principle which 
guides Swiss foreign policy. Back in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, the then 
predominant European powers recognised the neutrality of the Swiss con-
federation. Since then, this status has been reconfirmed several times, and 
Switzerland has adhered to the notion of (armed) neutrality as acknowledged 
in public international law. However, the Constitution does not state that neu-
trality in itself is a goal of Swiss foreign policy.9 Rather, neutrality is to be used 
as one of many instruments in order to achieve the goals set out above.
ᇴ. Cآؠأؘاؘءؘؖئ
ƞᄭ FƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ Cƞƹƿƺƹƾ
Foreign relations fall under the competences and responsibilities of the federa-
tion (Article 54 Constitution). This includes the competence to conclude tre-
aties. This competence for concluding treaties can result in the federation 
dealing with issues that also encompass policy areas which internally fall into 
the cantons’ domain. Thus, the federal authorities are obliged to protect the 
interests of the cantons in such a situation and to ensure that they participate 
in preparing and conducting treaty negotiations in an appropriate manner 
(Article 55 Constitution).
Despite the existence of Article 55 Constitution, the increasing tendency to 
take recourse to treaties has resulted in a tacit neutralisation of cantonal com-
petences. The bilateral agreements Switzerland has established with the EU, 
for instance, deal with matters partly falling into the domain of the cantons, 
9 e؛آؠؔئ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ M؜ئ؜ؖ/N؜ؖآ؟ؘ eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, Constitutional Law in 
Switzerland, 2nd edition, Alphen aan den Rijn 2012, n. 24; hؔ؟اؘإ Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, The Swiss 
Constitution in a Comparative Context, 2nd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƹ. ᇹᇳ ƣƿ ƾƣƼ. 
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such as cantonal police, recognition of professional qualifications and public 
procurement. Accordingly, to ensure that the cantons are not being effecti-
vely ignored or undermined, consultation and cooperation between the diffe-
rent layers of government are fundamentally important; more so today than 
in the past. The cantons have also taken their own steps to ensure their inte-
rests are represented: in 1993 they founded the Conference of the Cantonal 
GƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿƾ ᄬKƢKᄭ ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƣlƻƾ ơƺƺƽƢiƹƞƿƣ ƿƩƣ ƣƤƤƺƽƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƿƺ ƻƺƺl 
their interests and speak with one stronger voice.
The cantons are competent to independently conclude international tre-
aties in areas which fall under their remit, as long as the federation has not 
ƿƞkƣƹ ƞơƿiƺƹ iƹ ƿƩƞƿ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƻƺliơǄ ƤiƣlƢ iƿƾƣlƤ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇷᇸ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. Fƺƽ 
example, treaties between cantons and neighbouring states or sub- levels of 
states, such as the German Bundesländer, concern cross- border issues like 
transportation, infrastructure, waste management, and the protection of the 
environment.
Ɵᄭ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil, FƣƢƣƽƞl AƾƾƣƸƟlǄ, FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƽƿƾ
The fundamental principle of the separation of powers between the different 
branches of government is not just relevant to the Swiss political system in 
general,10 but is also a key principle in Swiss foreign policy. The functions 
of the Federal Council (including the federal administration), the Federal 
Assembly and the Federal Supreme Court within the context of international 
relations are as follows:
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl Cƺǀƹơil iƾ ƻƽiƸƞƽilǄ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƾǀƟ-
ject to the right of participation of the Federal Assembly (Article 184 
Constitution). It represents Switzerland abroad. The federal admin-
istration negotiates treaties, based on a mandate established by the 
Federal Council. The Federal Council is competent to conclude treaties 
of limited scope on its own; this is the case, inter alia, when a treaty does 
not create new obligations for Switzerland or when a treaty primarily 
concerns the authorities and involves technical administrative issues 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇹa of the Government and Administration Organisation Act).11
10 See the chapter on Constitutional Law, pp. 151.
11 Government and Administration Organisation Act of 21 March 1997 (GAOA), SR 172.010. 
dƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇹéᇷe- abᇸBᄭ.
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ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞƿƣƾ iƹ ƾƩƞƻiƹƨ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƻƺliơǄ ƞƹƢ ƾǀƻƣƽ-
ǁiƾƣƾ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞiƹƿƣƹƞƹơƣ ƺƤ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇸᇸ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. Iƿ 
must agree to the conclusion of treaties (unless the Federal Council 
can do so on its own). However, the Federal Assembly can only approve 
or reject a signed treaty in toto. In particular, in the case of “package 
deals” (such as the accession to the WTO),12 the Federal Assembly 
realistically has no other choice than to “wave” a treaty through. 
From a democratic point of view, this is problematic. It does not allow 
the treaty at issue to be subjected to proper scrutiny by the Federal 
Assembly in order to propose amendments. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Foreign Affairs Committees of the National Council and 
the Council of States must be consulted before the Federal Council 
adopts a negotiation mandate. Further, these committees are period-
ically informed about ongoing negotiations, to ensure they are able to 
offer relevant and up- to- date advice in this regard.
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƞơƿƾ ƺƹ ƞƻƻƣƞl, Ʃƣƞƽiƹƨ ơƞƾƣƾ ƢƣơiƢƣƢ ƣiƿƩƣƽ 
by the highest cantonal courts or by other federal courts. Thereby, it 
also interprets international law and shapes the relationship between 
international law and Swiss law.13
The ongoing shift in law- making from domestic legislation towards inter-
national treaties has led to a readjustment of the power balance between the 
Federal Assembly and the Federal Council (including the federal administ-
ration). The power of the latter is increased to the detriment of the former. 
Consequently, new procedures should be sought in order to enhance the par-
ticipation of the Federal Assembly as well as that of cantons and civil soci-
ety groups both in the preparatory phase of and throughout negotiations. 
Currently, the aforementioned groups’ participation in the treaty- making 
process is, from a democratic viewpoint, too marginal.
ơᄭ Diƽƣơƿ DƣƸƺơƽƞơǄ
Swiss citizens are regularly called upon to vote on issues which either direc-
tly or indirectly concern foreign relations and Switzerland’s position on the 
iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƻlƞƹƣ. eƩƣ Ƣiƽƣơƿ ƢƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ ƿƺƺlƾ ƺƹ ƺƤƤƣƽè ᅬ ƻƺƻǀlƞƽ iƹiƿiƞ-
ƿiǁƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢƞè ᅬ Ʃƞǁƣ ƢƣơiƾiǁƣlǄ ƾƩƞƻƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƿƽƣƞƿǄ- Ƹƞkiƹƨ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾ iƹ 
12 dƣƣ ƻƻ. ᇳᇸᇹ.
13 See pp. 179.
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Switzerland.14 The instruments are two distinct creations, but have a simil-
arly strong impact on Swiss international relations:
ᅬ é ƻƺƻǀlƞƽ iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ ƞllƺǂƾ ƞ ƸiƹiƸǀƸ ƺƤ ᇳᇲᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƿƺ ƢƣƸƞƹƢ 
ƞ ǁƺƿƣ ƺƹ ƞ ƻƽƺƻƺƾƣƢ ƽƣǁiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇵᇺᅬᇳᇵᇻb 
Constitution). Through popular initiatives, the people can have a sig-
nificant influence on Switzerland’s international relations. A prime ex-
ample of this was the popular initiative for the accession of Switzerland 
to the UN, which was approved of by the people and the cantons in 2002. 
This was a positive step forward in terms of Switzerland’s cooperation 
with the international community. However, over the last decade, an 
increasing number of initiatives have been incompatible with inter-
ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂ, ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣiƽ ǀƹƞƸƟiƨǀƺǀƾ ǂƺƽƢiƹƨ. KƣǄ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣƾ ƞƽƣ 
the initiative “against the construction of minarets” (“Gegen den Bau von 
Minaretten”, 2009), the initiative “for the expulsion of criminal foreign 
nationals” (“für die Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer”, 2010) and the 
initiative “against mass immigration” (“Gegen Masseneinwanderung”, 
2014). The implementation of initiatives such as these presents huge 
problems. This is particularly the case when the initiatives violate basic 
norms of international law. The initiative “against the construction 
of minarets” is not compatible with the freedom of religion (Article 9 
ECHR) and the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 ECHR). The ini-
tiative “for the expulsion of criminal foreign nationals” and the initiative 
“against mass immigration” are both incompatible with the Agreement 
on the Free Movement of Persons with the EU. Moreover, the initiative 
“for the expulsion of criminal foreign nationals” also violates the right to 
ƽƣƾƻƣơƿ Ƥƺƽ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ƞƹƢ ƤƞƸilǄ liƤƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇺ ECHcᄭ. OƤƿƣƹ, iƿ iƾ ƾiƸƻlǄ ƹƺƿ 
possible to fully implement such initiatives. Proposals for reform in this 
problematic area have been put forward; for example, there have been 
calls to introduce a provision according to which a popular initiative 
must comply with basic fundamental rights as guaranteed, for instance, 
in the ECHR in order to be valid. However, it is crucial to note that any 
revision to this effect would itself require the approval of the people and 
the cantons, which may pose a real obstacle.15
14 For more information on these instruments, see the chapter on Constitutional Law, pp. 151.
15 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 597 et seqq.
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ᅬ é ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ ƞllƺǂƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƿƺ ǁƺƿƣ, iƹƿƣƽ ƞliƞ, ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹơlǀƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƹ 
iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƿƽƣƞƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇶᇲᅬᇳᇶᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. é ƸƞƹƢƞƿƺƽǄ ƽƣƤƣƽ-
endum takes places in the case of an accession to an organisation for 
collective security (e.g. NATO) or to a supranational community (e.g. the 
EU); such an accession needs the approval of a majority of the people 
and a majority of the cantons. The vote on the envisaged accession to 
the EEA, eventually rejected by the people and the cantons in 1992, was 
conducted under this title, due to its potential political and economic 
significance. In addition, an optional referendum can be requested by 
50’000 citizens against the conclusion of an international treaty that: is 
of unlimited duration and cannot be terminated; provides for accession 
to an international organisation; contains important legislative provi-
sions or requires the enactment of federal legislation for implementa-
tion. Decisive for the outcome is the vote of the people; a majority of the 
cantons is not required. The bilateral agreements concluded with the EU 
in 1999, the “Bilaterals I”, and the Schengen/Dublin association agree-
ments of 2004 were all approved of in optional referenda.
It should be noted that regarding referendum votes on treaties, the peo-
ple often do not possess a real option (a situation somewhat resembling that 
faced by the Federal Assembly in the case of “package deals”). Practical cons-
traints and opportunity costs can de facto force the people to approve a tre-
aty. Typical examples of this sort of situation are votes on amendments to the 
Schengen/Dublin association agreements in order to keep them in line with 
dynamic EU law; rejecting such amendments would seriously endanger the 
fate of these agreements altogether. Therefore, when the people approved the 
incorporation of the Council Regulation on biometrics in passports and travel 
documentsᇳᇸ iƹƿƺ ƿƩƣ dơƩƣƹƨƣƹ éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ǂiƿƩ ᇷᇲ.ᇳè% ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ǁƺƿƣƾ iƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇺ, 
ƸƞƹǄ ƟƽƣƞƿƩƣƢ ƞ ƾiƨƩ ƺƤ ƽƣliƣƤèᅬ ƞ ƹƣƨƞƿiǁƣ ǁƺƿƣ ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƾƣƽiƺǀƾlǄ ƣƹƢƞƹƨƣ-
red the continuation of the Schengen Association Agreement and, by virtue of 
the guillotine clause linking these two treaties, also of the Dublin Association 
Agreement.
ᇳᇸ Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security 
features and biometrics in passports and travel documents.
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ᇵ. cؘ؟ؔا؜آءئ؛؜أ Bؘاتؘؘء Iءاؘإءؔا؜آءؔ؟ Lؔت ؔءؗ 
dت؜ئئ Lؔت
The federal authorities and the cantons are obliged to respect international 
law in all their activities (Article 5 IV Constitution). Based thereon and in 
light of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Federal Supreme Court has 
developed a rich stream of case law concerning the validity, rank and effect of 
international law in Switzerland:
ᅬ dǂiƾƾ lƞǂ Ƥƺllƺǂƾ ƿƩƣ Ƹƺƹiƾƿ ƿƽƞƢiƿiƺƹ. eƩƣƽƣƤƺƽƣ, ƿƽƣƞƿiƣƾ ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞǁƣ 
been duly entered into force automatically become part of domestic 
law. An act of transformation is not needed.17
ᅬ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂ ƨƣƹƣƽƞllǄ ƿƞkƣƾ ƻƽƣơƣƢƣƹơƣ ƺǁƣƽ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞl lƞǂ. eƩiƾ 
is unequivocally the case for peremptory norms of international law 
(ius cogens); such norms always overrule any conflicting provisions of 
national law. Moreover, treaties concluded by Switzerland supersede 
federal acts in the case of a conflict, unless the Federal Assembly has 
intentionally enacted legislation which violates the treaty obligation; 
in such a case, the authorities shall apply the federal act (Schubert case 
law).18 However, this Schubert exception is subject to two key limita-
tions: treaties which guarantee fundamental rights, such as the ECHR, 
and the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons with the EU19 
must be respected in all cases; the Schubert exception does not apply.20 
The Federal Supreme Court has not yet explicitly decided whether 
these considerations equally apply in the case of a conflict between a 
treaty and the Constitution.21
ᅬ é ƻƺǂƣƽƤǀl iƹƾƿƽǀƸƣƹƿ Ƥƺƽ ƞǁƣƽƿiƹƨ ơƺƹƤliơƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƸƣƿƩƺƢ ƺƤ iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿ-
ing Swiss law in a way that ensures its conformity with international 
law. The Swiss authorities routinely employ this method.22
ᅬ IƹƢiǁiƢǀƞlƾ ơƞƹ iƹǁƺkƣ ƿƽƣƞƿǄ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ iƹ ƻƽƺơƣƣƢiƹƨƾ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƻǀƟliơ 
authorities directly if they are self- executing, i.e. if they both confer 
17 See already BGE 7 I 774, a judgment of the Federal Supreme Court of 1881.
18 BGE 99 Ib 39.
19 See pp. 181.
20 BGE 125 II 417; BGE 142 II 35.
21 dƣƣ BGE ᇳᇵᇻ I ᇳᇸ.
22 BGE ᇻᇶ I ᇸᇸᇻ.
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rights on individuals and are sufficiently clear and unconditional to 
preclude any need for implementing legislation.23 Typically, human 
rights treaties as well as the main bilateral agreements with the EU 
are directly applicable. However, a key problem with this principle is 
its vulnerability to interpretation: sometimes the courts refrain from 
applying treaty provisions directly, even though they seem to obviously 
meet the conditions of clarity and unconditionality. WTO agreements, 
for instance, are not considered to be directly applicable.24 The Federal 
Supreme Court has also, time and again, refused to directly apply the 
free trade agreement concluded in 1972 with the EU. This mercantilist 
approach is the subject of controversial debate. There are competing 
interests at stake: for example, ensuring the effectiveness of inter-
national law versus maintaining both balanced international legal 
relations (reciprocity) and the domestic balance of powers. Concerns 
as to the lack of adequate democratic representation in international 
law- making are a key part of the debate.
Iƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ aƣƺƻlƣ’ƾ aƞƽƿǄ ᄬdgaᄭ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ “dǂiƾƾ lƞǂ 
instead of foreign judges (self- determination initiative)” (“Schweizer Recht 
statt fremde Richter [Selbstbestimmungsinitiative]”). According to the pro-
posed text, the Swiss Constitution is the highest source of law in Switzerland. 
In the case of a conflict between the Constitution and a treaty, the former 
prevails (with the exception of ius cogens). In such a circumstance, the treaty 
must be renegotiated; if necessary, it must be terminated. The proposed text 
reflects the concern that the scope for domestic policy- making is becoming 
increasingly limited by international law. However, the way the text addres-
ses this concern is hardly useful. The idea of establishing a rigid hierarchy 
between the Constitution and international law oversimplifies the complex 
interplay between these legal dimensions. Moreover, the wording of the initi-
ative is too ambiguous: for example, under what exact circumstances would 
it become “necessary” to terminate a treaty? Fundamentally, this initiative 
endangers both legal security and Switzerland’s reputation as a reliable part-
ner in international relations. The people will vote on this proposal in due 
course.
23 BGE 124 III 90.
24 e؛آؠؔئ Cآاا؜ؘإ/Mؔاا؛؜ؔئ Oؘئؖ؛, International Trade Regulation: Law and Policy in 
the WTO, the European Union and Switzerland. Comments, Cases, and Materials, Bern/
London 2005, pp. 223.
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III. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
In the following section, two key cases which demonstrate Switzerland’s 
involvement and interaction with the international community will be dis-
cussed. One case, which came before the Federal Supreme Court, clarified the 
position of Swiss law with respect to the Agreement on the Free Movement of 
Persons between the EU and Switzerland (1.). The second case demonstrates 
Switzerland’s participation in an international dispute settlement procedure, 
through its membership of the WTO (2.).
ᇳ. dبأإؘؠؔؖج آؙ ا؛ؘ Aؚإؘؘؠؘءا آء ا؛ؘ Fإؘؘ 
Mآةؘؠؘءا آؙ aؘإئآءئ
AA, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, had been residing in Switzerland 
since 2002. In the same year, she gave birth to a boy, BA. The father of BA was 
C, a German citizen who also lived in Switzerland. Based on these relation-
ships, AA and BA were granted a residence permit in Switzerland, derived 
from C’s right of residence under the Agreement on the Free Movement of 
Persons. In 2013, however, the competent authority in the Canton of Zurich 
refused to prolong AA’s residence permit, on the grounds that she had been 
dependent on social security payments for several years. They did, however, 
grant her son, BA, a residence permit, derived from his father’s right of resi-
dence. The authority argued that the existence of BA did not require that AA 
received a residence permit; AA could take her son with her upon leaving the 
country or alternatively he could remain in Switzerland under his father’s 
care. AA challenged this refusal. She argued that she had a right to reside in 
Switzerland based on the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons.
The substantive outcome of the case was that the Federal Supreme Court 
confirmed the decision of the cantonal authority upon appeal.25 However, 
the most interesting points of the judgement were discussed by the Court 
25 BGE 142 II 35.
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by way of introduction to the case, where two issues which had been hotly 
debated in the aftermath of the approval of the popular initiative “against 
mass immigration” (“Gegen Masseneinwanderung”, 2014) were clarified. 
First, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed that the Agreement on the 
Free Movement of Persons is to be interpreted in light of the case law that 
has been developed by the European Court of Justice in interpreting EU law 
provisions on the free movement of persons. A parallel interpretation of the 
éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Fƽƣƣ MƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ aƣƽƾƺƹƾèᅬ i.ƣ. ƞƹ iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƞƿiƺƹ ǂƩiơƩ 
Ƥƺllƺǂƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣèEǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ Cƺǀƽƿ ƺƤ Jǀƾƿiơƣèᅬ iƾ ƾǀƻƻƺƽƿƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ aƽƣƞƸƟlƣ 
of the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons’ objective, which is “to 
bring about the free movement of persons between [Switzerland and the EU] on 
the basis of the rules applying in the European Community”. As such, a parallel 
interpretation is also in line with the teleological method of interpretation, 
as provided for in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
There is no explicit obligation on Switzerland to follow European Court of 
Justice judgements, except in the case of those judgements rendered before 
Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇻ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇸ éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Fƽƣƣ MƺǁƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ aƣƽƾƺƹƾᄭ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, 
an autonomous interpretation shall only be followed if there are cogent rea-
sons to do so. In this case, the Federal Supreme Court made it clear that the 
new Articles 121a and 197 No 11 Constitution do not constitute such cogent rea-
sons. Thus, they interpreted the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons’ 
provisions in light of the pertinent case law of the EU and, upon this basis, 
confirmed the decision of the cantonal authority to refuse to reissue AA with 
a residence permit.
Second, the Federal Supreme Court clarified the relationship which exists 
between the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons and federal acts. 
In the case of a conflict, the former takes precedence over the latter. This 
remains the case even when the Federal Assembly intentionally violates the 
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons in full knowledge of the legal 
and/or political consequences of such an action. Thus, it can be seen that the 
Schubert exception does not apply within the scope of the Agreement on the 
Free Movement of Persons.ᇴᇸ The Federal Supreme Court based this finding on 
the observation that the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons leads 
to a harmonisation of the legal order (sectoral participation in the common 
market) through the realisation of a basic freedom, as well as on the fact that 
EU law is directly applicable in EU member states and claims supremacy over 
ᇴᇸ See pp. 179.
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national laws. With respect to the case at hand, however, it was not apparent 
whether these considerations were relevant in order to decide the case (thus 
forming part of its ratio decidendi) or whether they were obiter dicta.
The message sent out by the Federal Supreme Court is clear: legislation 
implementing Articles 121a and 197 No 11 Constitution which violates the 
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons would have no practical effect. 
EU citizens could still directly rely on the Agreement on the Free Movement 
of Persons; the Federal Supreme Court would continue to uphold these rights. 
In fact, since this ruling the Federal Assembly has implemented the new pro-
visions in an Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons- consistent way.27 
Unsurprisingly, the judgment of the Federal Supreme Court has been received 
controversially. Some see it as the Federal Supreme Court ignoring the voice 
of the people, who voted in favour of Articles 121a and 197 No 11 Constitution 
but have found that there continues to be no real practical enforcement of 
these new articles. One key positive aspect of the judgement is that it enhan-
ces legal security and contributes to the reliability of Switzerland in the realm 
of external relations.
ᇴ. fd dؘؙؚؔبؔإؗ Mؘؔئبإؘئ آء dاؘؘ؟ aإآؗبؖائ
In 2002, the then President of the United States, Gؘآإؘؚ h. Bبئ؛, imposed 
definitive safeguard measures on various steel products. The measures con-
ƾiƾƿƣƢ ƺƤ ƞƢƢiƿiƺƹƞl ƿƞƽiƤƤƾ ƽƞƹƨiƹƨ ƤƽƺƸ ᇺ % ƿƺ ᇵᇲ % ƞƹƢ ǂƣƽƣ iƹƿƣƹƢƣƢ “to 
facilitate positive adjustment to competition from imports of certain steel pro-
ducts”.28 Consequently, some products of foreign steel producers were kept 
out of the US market; the prices of others were artificially increased. Swiss 
companies were amongst the affected producers. As a direct response to the 
US measures, the EU adopted its own safeguard measures on steel products: it 
imposed a tariff quota system in order to limit trade diversion resulting from 
US protectionism. The EU measures were even more problematic for the Swiss 
steel industry than the original US ones.
EiƨƩƿ heO ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾèᅬ ƿƩƣ Ef, Jƞƻƞƹ, Kƺƽƣƞ, CƩiƹƞ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, NƺƽǂƞǄ, 
Nƣǂ kƣƞlƞƹƢ ƞƹƢ Bƽƞǅilè ᅬ ơƩƞllƣƹƨƣƢ ƿƩƣ fd ƾƞƤƣƨǀƞƽƢ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƟƣƤƺƽƣ 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), arguing that the measures were 
27 See pp. 170.
28 US Presidential Proclamation No. 7529 of 5 March 2002.
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iƹơƺƹƾiƾƿƣƹƿ ǂiƿƩ éƽƿiơlƣ iIi Gƣƹƣƽƞl éƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƹ eƞƽiƤƤƾ ƞƹƢ eƽƞƢƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇶ 
and the Agreement on Safeguards. According to long- standing case law, 
these rules permit WTO members to apply safeguard measures only when, 
as a result of unforeseen developments, a product is being imported in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to 
cause serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly com-
petitive products. After unfruitful consultations, a panel was established to 
examine the matter. The panel determined that the conditions for the impo-
sition of safeguard measures were not met in the case of the United States 
for any steel product at issue. On appeal, the Appellate Body confirmed the 
ruling.29
After the Appellate Body had issued its report, President Bبئ؛ terminated 
the safeguard measures. A combination of some of the following four reasons 
might have been decisive in making him do so:
ᅬ Fiƽƾƿ, ƿƩƣ éƻƻƣllƞƿƣ BƺƢǄ ƢƣƿƣƽƸiƹƣƢ ǀƹƣƼǀiǁƺơƞllǄ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ 
violated WTO law. From a legal perspective, the United States were 
hence obliged to withdraw the measures; respect for the rule of law 
demanded this.
ᅬ dƣơƺƹƢ, aƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿ Bبئ؛ was anxious to please constituencies in the 
States which had traditionally been home to many steel- industry jobs, 
such as Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia. From a political per-
spective, he had already accomplished what he had intended through 
the initial imposition of the measures.
ᅬ eƩiƽƢ, iƿ ƩƞƢ ƟƣơƺƸƣ iƹơƽƣƞƾiƹƨlǄ ƞƻƻƞƽƣƹƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ǂƣƽƣ 
having a negative effect on the US industry as a whole. The safeguard 
measures did more harm to the steel- using industries than good to the 
steel-producing industry. Thus, from an economic viewpoint, the ter-
mination of the measures was somewhat logical.
ᅬ FƺǀƽƿƩ, heO lƞǂ ƻƣƽƸiƿƾ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ƞƤƤƣơƿƣƢ ƟǄ heO lƞǂ- iƹơƺƸƻƞƿiƟlƣ 
safeguard measures to apply re- balancing measures.30 As such, various 
co- complainants who participated in the WTO dispute settlement 
29 fdèᅬ DƣƤiƹiƿiǁƣ dƞƤƣƨǀƞƽƢ Mƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƺƹ IƸƻƺƽƿƾ ƺƤ Cƣƽƿƞiƹ dƿƣƣl aƽƺƢǀơƿƾ, he/Ddᇴᇷᇵ/
AB, issued 10 November 2003 (complaint of Switzerland).
30 Under the Agreement on Safeguards, an affected member is permitted to apply re- 
balancing measures, whereas the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) allows a 
complaining party to suspend obligations vis- à- vis the defending party if the latter does 
not comply with a panel or Appellate Body ruling.
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proceedings were planning to impose re- balancing measures against 
the United States. The EU, the complainant by far the most affected 
by the safeguard measures, had already adopted a regulation setting 
out potentially targeted products, such as fruits and vegetables, textile 
products and Harley Davidson motorcycles.31 Japan, China, Norway and 
Switzerland followed suit and threatened to adopt similar re- balancing 
measures. By terminating the US safeguard measures, President Bبئ؛ 
could avoid the adoption of potentially very harmful re- balancing 
Ƹƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƿƩƣèfd.
This has been the only WTO case in which Switzerland has actively par-
ticipated, as a complaining or defending party, to date. In the end, the Swiss 
delegation was content with the final outcome: it successfully relied on WTO 
law and prevailed over the United States, resulting in the termination of the 
harmful safeguard measures. However, at the same time, their satisfaction 
was not absolute. Although the US measures were declared unlawful eventu-
ally, in the meantime, Swiss steel producers suffered real damage due to the 
trade- restrictive measures imposed by both the US and the EU and the loss 
of market shares, which they then had to regain tediously. In this context, it 
is problematic that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism does not provide 
for compensation for damages suffered due to unlawful actions.
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 1031/2002 of 13 June 2002 establishing additional customs 
duties on imports of certain products originating in the United States of America; see 
also WTO Document G/C/10, G/SG/43 of 15 May 2002.
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